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NOT SO LONG AGO, financial resources were commonly regarded as
"the sinews of war." Modern economists, however, eager to tear
aside the "monetary veil" and reveal the basic. relationships behind
it, have pointed out that wars are not fought with money at all, but
with men, materials, and machines. Given adequate supplies of these
resources, they have argued, the money needed to obtain them for
war can always be found or created. But this argument has been
oversold, as is so often the case; it has tended to divert attention
from the very real difficulties of establishing control over financial
resources in wartime.
Money —noless than men, materials, and machines —ishard to
mobilize for war. The more a nation relies on the money mechanism
rather than on conscription to reallocate resources for war purposes,
the greater the danger of inflation. When resources are obtained for
war through the market, their prices must be bid up to their "trans-
fer level" and money incomes rise without any commensurate in-
crease in supplies of consumer goods. Sterilizing enough of the rise
in money incomes to prevent inflation is extremely difficult, as Cana-
dian experience shows. Even if resources of a money economy are
drafted into wartime uses, the task of making money incomes follow
them is far from simple. Indeed, the crucial problem of war finance
is to dislodge money from its customary channels and guide it into
the public treasury, in a manner that provides enough income in-
centive to shift resources and nevertheless avoids undue hardship for
any group.
Postwar demobilization, too, presents difficulties for both finan-
cial and physical resources. If wartime increases in money incomes
are diverted from peacetime channels by methods other than taxa-
tion, pent-up demands tend to accumulate in the form of 'volatile
stocks of money and other liquid assets. Money held harmlessly idle
1during war may become dangerously active in peace; money safely
diverted through investment in government obligations may return
too quickly to consumer spending. Even if war is tax-financed, there
is still the chance that new money may spring to life after the war as
long-suppressed demands break through present restraints. Conse-
quently, while men, materials, and machines need mainly guidance
into peacetime occupations once the war is won, money may need
continued surveillance. A major aim of postwar finance must be to
so order financial resources that inflation is averted while a high
level of production and consumption is encouraged.
All financial institutions, including all concerns handling money
in significant quantities, are inevitably involved in war finance. They
will have a vital role in the accomplishment of postwar readjust-
ment. Knowledge of how they are affected by war finance and what
readjustments they will have to face after the war will help to solve
more general postwar problems.
Canada has been at war two years longer than the United States.
Her expressed financial objectives are the same: to make sure that
financial resources are available in whatever degree may be required
by the war effort; to do this with a minimum of wartime inflation
and without storing up insuperable postwar financial problems.
Canada and the United States have faced common problems before,
have often arrived at similar solutions. An examination of the func-
tioning of Canadian financial institutions in wartime, and the effects
of war upon these institutions, may provide useful guides for dealing
with American problems.
Canada also provides an opportunity of comparing results when
financial resources are marshalled with military precision, as they
appear to have been in World War II, and when they are allowed
to dodge the draft, as they obviously were in World WarI. In the
first World War, the wholesale price level doubled and the cost of
living rose 55 percent1 although war expenditures of the Canadian
government never reached io percent of gross national product.1
Inflation continued at an accelerated pace for a year and a half after
the war and was followed by a sharp recession, an unbalanced re-
covery in the twenties and prolonged depression in the thirties. Dur-
ing the first two years of the present war the wholesale price level
1Totalvalue of all goods and services produced.
2was permitted to rise only 27 percent and the cost of living only i
percent, while in the next two years wholesale prices rose only 9
percent and cost of living less than 5 percent; yet war expenditures
by the end of 1943 exceeded half the gross national product. For
comparison of indices of Canada in the two wars with those of Great
Britain and the United States in War II reference is made to Chart I.
CHART I —CANADIANCOST OF LIVING RISES LESS IN WAR II
Sources: Canada —DominionBureau of Statistics, Cost of Living Index Numbers for
Canada, 1913-1942 and Prices and Price Indexes; United States —FederalReserve
Bulletin; Great Britain —Ministryof Labour, Gazette.
Of course, prices of civilian goods are a less reliable index of con-
ditions in the economy as a whole in War II than they were in War I,
just because they cover a much smaller share of total output. In war-
time, ordinary indices of prices and production are of limited re-
liability even for civilian goods and services; they are still less re-
liable for war products. Perhaps a species of "inflation" not revealed












































1918economy. Swelling wages and profits in war industry give some hint
that such may be the case, despite relatively stable prices in the
civilian sector. As suggested below, any such development may bring
new kinds of postwar problems in its wake. Despite statistical diffi-
culties, however, Canada's experience in the two World Wars re-
veals such striking contrasts that a comparison should yield lessons
both for war finance and for postwar reconstruction.
Canada Mobilizes Its Financial System
Leadership in formulating Canadian financial policy in War II has
been assumed by the executive branch of the government. Budgets
have included proposed tax legislation, and proposals for wartime
tax increases have been drastic; yet each war budget presented by
the Ministry of Finance has been passed by Parliament with little
discussion and with minor modifications. The tug-of-war betwee,n
the legislative and executive branches of government that has at
times complicated American wartime economic policy has been
much less apparent in Canada —partly,perhaps, because all war
agencies are responsible to a few Ministers, and these Ministers are
themselves Members of Parliament. The Canadian financial system
is a relatively simple one; it consists of a single central bank in close
working relationship with the Department of Finance, half a dozen
major branch banking systems whose head offices keep close contact
with Ottawa, a handful of large insurance companies under a Super-
intendent in Ottawa, and a number of smaller banks and insurance
companies, investment houses, trust companies, and retail credit
concerns. This simplicity has facilitated cooperation both in the
formulation and the administration of financial policy.
Table iprovidesa summary picture of Canadian war finance over
the first four "war years," August 31,1939 toAugust 31, 1943,in
general the period covered by this study.2 It shows the rapid growth
of government outlays from iopercent of gross national product in
the twelve months before the war to 49 percent in the fourth year of
war. It also reflects the government's determination since the early
stages of the war to cover only half of its total outlays by borrowing
and the other half by taxes and other current revenue.
2Inthe Canadian economy, seasonal fluctuations have a marked effect upon financial
and other economic data, and it is important to start and finish historical economic
analysis in the same month where possible.
4TABLE I —CANADIANWAR FINANCE, 1939-43
(dollar figures in millions)
.
Item
Twelve Months Ending August 31
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
Cash Requirements S •
War a $36 $788 $1,655 $3,042 $4,253
Otherb 510 481 425 540 568
TOTAL 546 1,269 2,080 3,582 4,821
Sources of Financing
Currentrevenuec 467 615 1,100 1,757 2,403
Net borrowingd 67 677 1,285 1,378 2,693
Balancing item e 12 — 23 — 305 447 —275
TOTAL 546 1,269 '2,080, 3,582 4,821
Gross national product! 5,330 6,140 7,570 8,920 9,900
Cash requirements in percent .
of gross national product 10% 21% 27% 40% 49%
Current revenue in percent
of cash requirements 86 48 53 49 50
Source: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary (August-September 1943).
a Includes outlays under War Appropriation Acts, War Appropriation (United King-
dom Financing) Act, United Nations Mutual Aid Act, war advances, advances to the
Foreign Exchange Control Board, repatriation of Dominion and Canadian National
Railway securities held in the United Kingdom, special loan to the United Kingdom
Government, and increases in the government's foreign balances.
b Includes a compensation to Provinces, unemployment insurance costs, reserves against
deficits of Canadian Wheat Board, Special Agricultural and Relief Expenditure, C.N.R.
deficit, interest charges, cost of loan campaigns, and other ordinary expenditures. The
total governmental outlay might quite legitimately be considered "war expenditure"
for the four war years.
c Almost entirely taxes.Excludes return on investments, which are deducted from
interest charges.
d Includes borrowing from Bank of Canada by Foreign Exchange Control Board.
Mainly increase (—)ordecrease (+) in government's Canadian cash balance.
f Dominion Bureau of Statistics figures (April 1943 revision) adjusted by the author on
the basis of Financial Post figures for 1938 and 1942, and extended to "war years." The
DBS figures are currently under revision, and TheFinancial Post figuresare considered
reasonably satisfactory by many economists working on income data.
In the United States, the growth of war expenditures relative to
gross national product has been much the same as in Canada, but
both countries have lagged behind Britain in this respect. Neither
Britain nor the United States has been as successful as Canada in
meeting war expendituresby taxes. In the fiscal year 1943-44, how-
ever, both Britain and Canada will probably cover half their outlays
5by taxes, while the United States will probably increase tax revenues
to more than 40 percent of cash requirements.3
War Expenditures
As the fourth war year ended, Canada was spending about $3.5 bil-
lion annually on war production and was maintaining armed forces
numbering nearly three-quarters of a million men.4 Each week, with
a working force just over i o percent of the American, Canada was
producing io,ooo tons of chemicals and explosives, 25 million rounds
of small arms ammunition, 4,000 military vehicles and 450 armored
fighting vehicles including tanks, 1,200 gun barrels or mountings,
millionof instruthents and communications equipment, 8o
fighting aircraft, and 6 ships. Only 30 percent of this output was
delivered to Canada's own fighting forces; 70 percent went to the
other United Nations.
These figures represent enormous industrial expansion for Can-
ada. Before the war, the country was producing less than one plane
per week, and had built no seagoing vessels for 20 years, while in
1943 her various types of fighters and bombers were outstanding in
their respective classes, and Canada rivaled Britain as a shipbuilder.
In that year her tonnage delivered per capita was well in excess of
American. Canada now has the two largest blast furnaces in the
British Empire, and total steel production has more than doubled.
Output of tool and alloy steels has increased fivefold, and of alumi-
num more than six times over. Canadian agricultural output rose
from $1.2 billion in 1939 to $2 billion in 1942. Canadian railways
are handling o percent more freight than ever before. Using
August 1939 as a base, the indices of industrial production suggest
a somewhat greater expansion in Canada than in the United States.5
3 See R. A. Musgrave and H. L. Seligman, "The Wartime Tax Effort in the United
States, the United Kingdom and Canada," Federal Reserve Bulletin (January 1944)
p. 16, and Proceedings of the National Tax Association, covering the conference for
November 22, 1943.
4 Wartime Information Board, Canada at War (September 1943) pp. 12, 24. Other
sources of data used in this section are: Department of Munitions and Supply, The
Industrial Front (January and July 1943), and the report to Parliament of the Minister
of Munitions and Supply (C. D. Howe), House of Commons Debates (June 11, 1943).
5 Federal Reserve Board for the United States and Dominion Bureau of Statistics
(henceforth DBS) for Canada. Expansion was about 154 percent for Canada and 128
percent for the United States, but in view of the inevitable inaccuracy of indices
when the components are changing rapidly, comparisons may be misleading.
6The financing of such a war effort without a serious rise in prices
of civilian goods has been no simple task,, although it has been alle-
viated by the excess capacity and unemployment that existed at the
beginning of the war. At that time, there were some 330,000 unem-
ployed workers,6 and another 400,000 have been added, to the labor
supply by the growth in population during four years of war. Also,
over 270,000 women, boys and older men, not previously considered
part of the labor supply, were drawn into employment.
Thus total employment, including the armed forces, increased
from 5 million on August 31, 1939 to 5.9 million on January 30,
1943. The armed forces grew from io,ooo to 645,000, and employ-
ment in war industries from nearly nothing.to 1,036,000. In these
two fields combined, employment increased 750,000 more than total
employment, a development made possible by a drop in agriculture
of 500,000 and in civilian industries of 250,000.8
The techniques and market. structures of canadian manufactur-
ing are such that it has a margin of excess capacity even in peacetime
prosperity.9 At the outbreak of war agriculture was depressed, the
pulp and paper industry was operating far below capacity, the iron
and steel industry at 50 percent. Although the metal industries most
closely related to war production —nickel,aluminum, copper —had
been brought to a high level of output by European rearmament,
even they were not operating at maximum capacity. However, for
producing such highly important war supplies as tanks, arms and
munitions, aircraft, naval vessels, and alloy steels, new plant and
equipment were necessary. Thus, the absorption of idle resources
has been a more important factor in the war effort than diversion of
resources already employed in 1939.
6 The 330,000 figure of unemployment is the official estimate of the DBS. Professor
Plumptre estimated prewar unemployment at 600,000, defining "labor supply" more
comprehensively than the DS. (Mobilizing Canada's Resources for War, Toronto,
1941.)
7 It will be noted that according to Professor Plumptre's definition of labor supply,
there must have still been 100,000 unemployed in Canada in January 1943.
8 The source of these figures of employment is a speech delivered in the House of
Commons on June 23, 1943 by Minister of Labour Mitchell (House of Commons
Debates, June 23, 1943, p. 4035). The figure of agricultural employment includes
farm women.
9 See L. G. Reynolds, Control of Competition in Canada (Cambridge, 1940), and
Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads (King's Printer, Ottawa, 1937)
p. 193.
7This excess capacity, together with depletion of inventories and
improvements in technique, prevented any wartime reduction in
the aggregate supply of civilian goods during the period covered.
Figures provided by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics show pro-
duction of consumer goods was 6o percent above the prewar level in
December 1941, and still nearly 40 percent above that level in April
1943. Wholesale sales for the first eight months of 1943 were nearly
50 percent higher than before the war, and even 7 percent higher
than in the same period of 1942. Retail sales in the first eight months
of 1943 were more than 50 percent above the prewar level and 4. per-
cent above the same period for 1942, with sales still climbing above
records of previous years for all categories of commodities except
highly durable consumers' goods such as automobiles and radios.'°
The above figures suggest that physical consumption has actually in-
creased during the war. The Chairman of the Wartime Prices and
Trade Board has estimated that individual outlays on goods and
services rose from $.5 billion in 1939 to $4.5 billion in 1942. Even
when the price rise is taken into consideration these figures suggest
that for the period covered the, war effort did not reduce the total
volume of physical consumption. There has been, of course, some
deterioration in the quality of certain goods and services, but this
factor is difficult to measure.
The elasticity of Canada's productive capacity has greatly aided
the financing of her war expenditures; nevertheless, holding indi-
vidual consumer spending to a 30 percent increase in face of a 6o
percent rise in individual incomes from 1939 to 1942 was a financial
achievement of high order.
Taxation
The Canadian government has relied heavily upon taxation to "ster-
ilize" much of its large-scale war expenditures, and thus to prevent
runaway price inflation. As Table 2 shows, tax revenues for the four
war years were nearly five and a half times the level of the last pre-
war year. Budget estimates for fiscal iplace tax revenues at nearly
six times the level of fiscal '939.
J. R. Beattie, Deputy Chief of Research for the Bank of Canada,
has described the bold use of income taxation as "the backbone of
10 DBS, Economic Conditions in Canada During the First Nine Months of 1943







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0the government's policy." 11Thenumber of people paying income
tax has risen from 300,000 before the war to more than 2,000,000 at
the present time. Rates have been raised until total tax liability, in-
cluding the refundable portion, is now the highest in the world for
incomes in the middle brackets. A portion of taxes paid on 1942in-
come is refundable within two years of "cessation of hostilities," part
of itaxes is refundable a year later, and so forth. This refund-
able portion, officially called "minimum savings requirement," is
substantial. It dclines as a percentage of total tax liability as income
rises, reaching an upper limit of $8oo for a single person, $i,ooo for
a married person, plus $ioo for each dependent, at the $io,ooo in-
come level.
Deductions from the minimum savings requirement are per-
mitted for net payments on life insurance, retirement funds, and
principal payments on one personal residence. Consequently, most
taxpayers make use of permitted reductions from refundable taxes,
and taxes net of refundable portions may be a better basis for com-
parison. When refundable portions are excluded, Canadian rates
are somewhat below the Australian and British for some categories
of taxpayers, although still well above the American rates, especially
in the middle brackets. Australian rates are clearly the highest on
incomes between $7,000 and the very top brackets, even with mini-
mum savings included. In the top income brackets, rates in all four
countries are virtually confiscatory, but American rates are some-
what lower than the others.'2 Charts II and III show the develop-
ment of Canadian income taxes during the war, and a comparison of
British, American and Canadian rates.
11"CanadianWar Finance," Industrial Canada (February 1943).
12Forcomparisons of Canadian, American, British and Australian income tax rates,
see Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin(April 1943)p. 59, and
Musgrave and Seligman, op. cit. The Finance Ministry considered placing a "ceiling"
on incomes net of taxes when preparing the 1942 budget. In his budget speech, Mr.
lisley dealt with the matter as follows: "I have considered the suggestion that a maxi-
mum level should be set for net income after tax —thatwe should place a 'roof,' so
to speak, on what a person may be allowed to retain, whatever his actual income may
be. In the United States, where there is an awkward problem arising from the exist-
ence of large incomes from tax-exempt securities, there may be some special need for
legislation of this character. In this country, however, there would be no substantial
amount of revenue to be gained from imposing a 100 percent top rate rather than the
98 percent rate I am proposing." He pointed out that a married man with $100,000
income, of which $30,000 was earned, is left with about $21,000, while another with
$500,000 is left with only $37,000.
10CHART H —TAXESTAKE INCREASING SHARE OF CANADIAN INCOMES
TAXES '.REEUNDABLEPORTION
1939 1940. 1941 1942*
1.2% 6.7% 45% 24.5%
SINGLE
INCOME $1500
0.0% 3.8% 8.8% 21.6%
MARRIED-NO DEPENDENTS
INCOME $2000
1.2% 5.6% 11.3% 28.7%
MARRIED-TWO CHILDREN r INCOME: $4000
5.6% 32.7% 41.7% 56.4%
MARR1ED-N0 DEPENDENTS
INCOME: $20,000
1939 940 1941 I942"
* 1943and 1944 rates identical to 1942.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech (June 23, 1942).
The advent of truly high personal income taxes in 1941 made
more serious the discrepancies between income tax structures of
different provinces. Accordingly, Finance Minister lisley wrote to all
provincial premiers that the Dominion government would pay to
any province vacating the fields of personal and corporate income
taxes, either the amounts actually received by the province from
these taxes during the fiscal year ending nearest December 31, 1940,
or the amount actually paid by the province for net debt service less
succession duty collections during the same period. The Dominion
budget was drawn up on the assumption that this offer would be
accepted, as indeed it was. The government also agreed to recom-
pense the provinces for losses on gasoline taxes, and when rationing,
priorities and fiscal limitations on liquor consumption were intro-
duced, the Federal government undertook to make some restitution
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NET INCOME IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS
Source:U. S. Treasury Department, Bulletin (December 1942).
PERCENT
for losses of liquor taxes as well. The absorption of provincial in-
come and corporation taxes by the Federal government must of
course be considered when comparing the respective burdens of
Canadian and American taxes.
Under the 1942law,90 percent of estimated taxes on wages and
salaries was collected at the source, and there was an eight months'
lag between receipt of income and final payment of taxes. Since
April i percent of taxes on earned income has been collected
at the source; half the tax liability for 1942 was forgiven and pay-
ments already made in 1943 were applied to the '943 tax. The lag
between receipt of income and final payment of income taxes has
been reduced from eight months to zero for this 95 percent. Those
with investment income pay quarterly instalments in March, June,
September and December of 1944, on 1944 income, unless invest-
ment income is less than one-quarter of total income. Tax liability
is self-assessed on the basis of estimated 1944 income, and interest
12
200400 600penalties are imposed on underestimated statements. Half of the tax
liability on 1942 investment income over $3,000 is deferred until
the death of the taxpayer, when it is paid by the estate. For invest-
ment income under $3,000, half of the 1942 tax liability was totally
forgiven.
The 1941 budget introduced a Dominion inheritance tax for the
first time. The tax rate is a composite one, following the majority
of provincial inheritance taxes;it is determined mainly by the
amount each individual receives and his relationship to the deceased,
and to a lesser extent by the size of the whole estate. An exemption
of $20,000 is provided for the widow, and of $5,000 for dependent
children. Non-dependent children and grandchildren have lower
exemptions and pay higher rates. This tax has not been very prôduc-
tive; it yielded only $7 million in fiscal 'l2, around $14 million in
fiscal 1943, and an estimated $i8 million in fiscal '944.
The corporate income tax has been raised from 15 percent to i 8
percent since war began. In addition, under the 1942 law every com-
pany pays an excess profits tax of 12 percent of total profits, plus
100 percent of profits in excess of the average for the four fiscal
years, 1936-39, or another io percent of total profits, whichever is
greater. The effect of these provisions is to limit profits after taxes
to 70 percent of prewar profits before taxes. However, a refund equal
to 20 percent of profits in excess of 1 i6% percent of the prewar
"standard" will be made after the war; allowances are made for new
companies, concerns unusually depressed in the late thirties, and
the expansion of old firms that have been financed by security issues.
Before the war, commodity taxes of all kinds, including customs
duties, were responsible for two-thirds of Dominion tax, revenues.
The 8 percent sales tax alone provided nearly 30 percent of Domin-
ion tax revenues, while taxes on liquor, tobacco, beer, and sugar,
together with the tariff, yielded most of the rest of returns from com-
modity taxes. Howeyer, the wartime tax burden has been imposed by
the government according to the ability-to-pay principle, and there-
fore little use has been made of commodity taxes. In fact, the in-
crease in their yield has been the result more of increased consumer
expenditures than of any upward revision of tax rates. Exceptions
are the increased taxes on "luxury goods," the extension of the sales
tax to new commodities and a 20 percent tax on expenditures iii
dance halls, night clubs, receipts of motion picture theatres and so
13forth. Minor. changes have been made also in tariffs designed to
diminish demand for non-Empire goods and conserve foreign ex-
change. The same is true of the io percent "war exchange tax" on
non-Empire imports and of the sharp increase in excise taxes on
automobiles. In the aggregate these modifications have not con-
stituted a major instrument of fiscal policy.
Control of Prices and Production
One of the principal factors affecting financial institutions is gov-
ernment control of prices and production. Ceilings on wages and
prices help to limit the expansion of bank deposits and note circu-
lation. Rationing, by limiting consumption, improves the market
for government obligations. Priorities on raw materials and restric-
tions on the use of labor limit investment and narrow the operations
of security markets as well as the scope of bank lending. Rationing,
priorities, and consumer credit regulations make drastic inroads into
the business of retail credit concerns. Knowledge of these direct con-
trols is necessary to understand the wartime functioning of the finan-
cial system, since they are an integral part of the process of mobiliz-
ing financial resources.'3
In Canada, the regulation of production is delegated to the De-
partment of Munitions and Supply, which, like the War Production
Board in the United States, determines priority ratings, allocates
scarce materials, limits use of materials, and so forth. In cooperation
with industrialists, the Department has accomplished notable econ-
omies in the use of critical materials and sharp reductions in the
cost of war materials and supplies. In Canada as in the United States,
during iattention in the war production field was concentrated
upon the manpower problem. Efforts were made to improve the
allocation of manpower through the National Selective Service, and
the Inter-Departmental Committee on Labour Co-ordination en-
deavored to alleviate the skilled labor shortage through a War
Emergency Training Program.
13 For a more complete account of direct controls, see Jules Backman, The Price
Control and Subsidy Program in Canada (Brookings Institution,1943);National
Industrial Conference Board, Canada's Role in the American Hemisphere; Department
of Munitions and Supply, Wartime Controls in Canada and The Industrial Front; De-
partment of Labour, Wartime Orders-in-Council Affecting Labour; Jules Backman and
Henry Brodie, "Canadian Wartime Control of Industry,". Contemporary Law Pam
phlets, Series 4, No. 10 (New York University, 1942); Report of the Wartime Prices
and Trade Board, September 3, 1929 to March 31, 1943 and March 31 to December
31, 1913. /
14Control over prices and supplies of civilian goods and services is
concentrated in the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, which cor-
responds roughly to the Office of Price Administration plus the Office
of Civilian Requirements of the WPB in the United States. Unlike
these agencies, however, WPTB also regulates consumer credit, and
is not an independent agency, since it is responsible to the Minister
of Finance. This relationship, it may be pointed out, thus consti-
tutes a link between fiscal policy and direct controls.
The Wartime Prices and Trade Board is linked to the Depart-
ment of Munitions and Supply through the Wartime Industries
Control Board, which has been set up within the Department. The
Chairmen of WPTB and WICB are each members of the other
Board, and when actions affecting commodities under their juris-
diction are being considered, Controllers of WICB become tempo-
rary members of WPTB. Further integration has been obtained by
appointing Controllers of WICB Administrators of the same com-
modities for WPTB.
Restrictions, on consumer credit are similar in many respects to
those applied in the United States, and were introduced at about
the same time, in the fall of 1941.Formost consumer durable goods,
a down payment of one-third of the purchase price is required. The
value of any trade-in articles must be deducted from the purchase
price, and one-third of the balance covered in cash. Payments must
be completed within six to fifteen months, depending on the type
of commodity, and must include a minimum carrying charge equiva-
lent to 34 of ipercentper month on the total amount financed. In-
dividuals requesting unsecured loans from banks are required to
state that no part of the proceeds will be used to finance the down
payment of consumer durable goods. "Charge accounts" must be
paid by the 25th of the month after the purchase is made.
A general price ceiling was announced in November 1941.Max-
imum prices were set at the highest figure reached between Septem-
ber 15andOctober 1i ofthat year, with the ceiling to become effec-
tive on December i,1941. Thisorder covers all commodities, unless
specifically exempted, and a long list of services. Up to that time,
price controls had been selective. Non-farm rents, which had been
pegged in some centers under an order of September 1940,were
made subject also to a general ceiling in November 1941.Theceil-
ing came into effect on December o, and fixed rentals at their
'5October 11,1941level except where a previous limit had been set.
Certain commodities subject to seasonal price movements, such as
fruits and vegetables, were originally exempted by the Board, but
have since been subject to regulations.
A wage ceiling was introduced at the same time, under which
employers could not lower wages below the November 15,1941
level,and could raise them above that level only with permission
of the National War Labour Board. However, a cost-of-living bonus
was to be paid (or retracted) whenever the Dominion Bureau of
Statistics cost-of-living index rose' (or fell) by one point. The bonus
amounted to 25 cents per week for employees earning $25 per week
or more, or i percent of the weekly wage for workers earning less
than $25 weekly, for each rise of one point in the index. Anyone
earning less than $175 per month, regardless of rank, or who was
below the rank of foreman but earning less than $250permonth,
was deemed to earn "wages" while others earned "salaries." Salaries
were fixed at their November 7,1941level,and cost-of-living
bonuses were virtually excluded for salary earners.14 Prior to No-
vember 1941,therewas only one wage control order issued and it
merely instructed Conciliation and Investigation Boards to regard
the highest wage prevailing in the 1926-29 period, or any higher
level established up to December i6, 1940,as"fair," and permitted—
but did not compel —paymentof a cost-of-living bonus in addition.
Rationing in Canada also has taken much the same form as in the
United States, but it is somewhat less complex. By the end of 1943,
rationcards had been issued for gasoline, sugar, tea, coffee, meat,
butter and conserves. Liquor was rationed by provincial authorities,
and as in the United States, purchases of automobiles, tires, radios,
refrigerators and similar scarce consumer durables, were subject to
permit. True "point rationing" had been avoided, but meats were
divided into four categories, with weekly rations ranging from one
to two and one-half pounds per person according to the type pur-
chased; tea and coffee were interchangeable, as were the various
kinds of jams, syrups, and so forth, listed under "conserves."
Subsidies, together with remission of import duties and with bulk
purchasing, have played a major role in Canadian price control, and
14Bonusesto salary earners can be paid only if the employee earns no more than
$4,200 per year, and salary-plus-bonus does not exceed the remuneration of employees
not above the rank of foreman in the same concern.
i6are executed through the Commodity Prices Stabilization Corpora-
tion Ltd., a crown company set up under the direction of WPTB
and responsible to the Minister of Finance. Subsidies are paid to
permit price maintenance in the face of rising costs, generally at
whatever stage of the production-and-distribution process has the
fewest firms, which is usually the importing or primary processing
stage. In some cases, import duties have been reduced to avoid sulj.
sidy payments, while in others, the Corporation has bought large
quantities in the foreign market, and resold at prices compatible
with the ceiling.
In at least one case, subsidies were used for the express purpose of
avoiding a cost-of-living bonus. A compulsory bonus was declared in
July 1942,sincethe cost-of-living index rose 2.4pointsover the pre-
vious quarter. By November 1942,theindex had risen another .7
points, and there was danger that another bonus would be required
in January. In December, the government announced its intention
to use subsidies to reduce the prices of milk, oranges, tea and coffee,
and thus depress the index and escape the need for another bonus.
The government argued that the incipient wage-price spiral must be
checked, that a rise in the cost of living injured everyone and that a
wage bonus did not benefit all income earners. It pointed out also
that in any case a bonus would result in a flood of applications from
individual concerns for subsidies or permitted price increases.
The determination to use subsidies to "hold the line" greatly in-
creased subsidy costs. From November 1941whenthe program 'be-
gan until March 31,1943, theyamounted to only $millionfor im-
ports and $31millionfor domestic goods, and economies of mass
buying had kept trading losses of the Commodity Prices Stabiliza-
tion Corporation down to $3.3 million.15 An abrupt rise in subsi-
dies is seen in the fiscal year i forwhich the Minister of Finance
originally requested $120million.Later estimates suggest that this
figure may be 50percenttoo high. The budget for 1945carriesover
$200millionfor subsidies, but this figure may again prove to be an
overestimate.
Growing subsidy costs were a minor consideration in the govern.
ment's decision to permit a 35-cent cost-of-living bonus in Novem-
ber 1943.Otherfactors in the decision seem to have been a feeling
that the public needed a "scare," the desire to restore faith in the
15SeeBackman, op. cit., and Wartime Prices and Trade Board, op. cit.
17cost-of-living index itself, and labor's preference for higher wages
rather than stable costs of living. The Prime Minister then an-
nounced that the "cost-of-living bonus" would be scrapped, ançl all
bonuses to date incorporated into a "basic wage" above which no
increases would be permitted except where "injustices" were ap-
parent. Only if the cost-of-living index rose three points and stayed
up for two months would the government consider revision of this
wage policy. A new Federal labor code was announced at the same
time.
It should be noted that subsidy payments are by no means a total
loss to the Treasury, since holding prices down reduces the costs of
war. Moreover, because of expansion in total output, some firms
receiving subsidies are at the same time subject to ioo percent excess
profits taxes, so that subsidy payments are offset by a certain amount
of tax liability. It has been argued that the ultimate social costs of
subsidies might be negative16 considering the danger of an increase
in costs of war resulting from a continuous raising of the price
ceiling.
16 See S. E. Harris, "Subsidies and Inflation," American Economic Review (September
1943).
The matters dealt with in this chapter, especially fiscal policy considerations, are
treated more fully by B. S. Keirstead in his article, "Canada's War Against Inflation,"
soon to be published by the National Industrial Conference Board.
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